I
The policies of Margaret Thatcher's Conservative governments between 1979 and 1990 are popularly understood as the expression of 'Thatcherism'. This term remains, as ever, an illdefined concept subject to extensive debate.
2 Though some analysts have emphasised the material drivers of Thatcherism (either as a programme for saving capitalism following the crisis of the 1970s, or as effective election-winning statecraft), the debate amongst historians has primarily focused on its ideological character. 3 In particular, historians have attempted to identify the ideas which influenced and shaped the Thatcher governments. Thatcherism has been variously identified as having originated either in Margaret Thatcher's personal preferences and biases; in the ideas and traditions of the Conservative Party; or in the transnational intellectual and political movement of 'neoliberalism'.
Peter Riddell has argued that 'Thatcherism' was simply a reflection of Thatcher's personal instincts, which amounted to …a series of moral values and an approach to leadership rather than an ideology…
[an] expression of Mrs Thatcher's upbringing in Grantham, her background of hard work and family responsibility, ambition and postponed satisfaction, duty and patriotism. 4 For Eric Evans, Thatcher's convictions could be defined more specifically as [opposition to] state interference with individual freedom; state initiatives that encourage an ethos of 'dependency'; woolly consensuality; high levels of taxation;
terminology) consisted of a diverse range of intellectuals and institutions committed to the overthrow of the post-war social democratic order in defence of individual liberty. 11 In the British context, the relationship between neoliberalism and the political project of the Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher has primarily focused on the way in which neoliberal ideas entered British politics via dedicated 'think-tanks', the most notable of which were the Institute of Economic Affairs and the Tory-affiliated Centre for Policy Studies. 12 It is dangerous to make too easy an elision between Thatcherism and neoliberalism and easy to overestimate its coherence but, as Daniel Stedman-Jones noted, it is often accepted that whilst 'Thatcherism' may have developed in an unplanned way from its initial 'monetarist' economic strategy, 'it came to include many other measures that were inspired by neoliberal theories.'
13
Attempting to identify 'crisply unambiguous, essentialist definitions' of neoliberalism has become, according to Jamie Peck, 'the bane of many a political lexicographer.' 14 In general, efforts to understand neoliberalism fall into two categories. The first is a history of ideas approach which has sought to understand the development of neoliberal thought in the twentieth century. 15 The key contribution of this literature, other than to reveal the activism and impressive organisation of individuals and groups associated with the Mont Pelerin Society, has been to demonstrate that there was never a unified 'neoliberal' ideology. In particular, there was a tension between the early 'ordoliberal' tradition which emerged in Germany during the 1940s, and the later priorities of the 'Chicago school'. Where the former sought to use the State to break all private monopolies and to create entrepreneurial individuals through interventionist social and economic policies, the latter sought to liberate innately rational and self-interested individuals from the shackles of state bureaucracy through the maximisation of choice within a free market. 16 The second approach to analysing neoliberalism has been developed by sociologists working in a Foucauldian tradition. This approach develops Michel Foucault's concept of 'governmentality' which he introduced in his lectures at the College de France in 1978. 17 As part of his attempt to understand the exercise of power in liberal societies, Foucault identified a form of 'neoliberal governmentality' in which individuals are required to take responsibility for their own self-government. From this perspective, neoliberalism is understood as a process of subjectification, in which the individual is constructed according to specific moral, ethical, and behavioural norms. According to Thomas Lemke, in his summary of Foucault's argument:
[t]he key feature of the neo-liberal rationality is the congruence it endeavours to achieve between a responsible and moral individual and an economic-rational actor. It aspires to construct prudent subjects whose moral quality is based on the fact that they rationally assess the costs and benefits of a certain act as opposed to other alternative acts. As the choice of options for action is, or so the neo-liberal notion of rationality would have it, the expression of free will on the basis of a selfdetermined decision, the consequences of the action are borne by the subject alone, who is also solely responsible for them. analysis attempts to achieve this by examining the Thatcherite concept of 'the individual', and the Thatcher governments' agenda for reform of the individual, via a case study of the development and introduction of a major social policy innovation: the 'Personal Pension'.
II
In the 1980s, Conservative governments reshaped the landscape of British pensions, both private and public, through an array of legislative changes. Their most obviously revolutionary change was to introduce a new system of individualised 'personal pensions' in the 1986 Finance Act. Thereby, in combination with the Social Security Act of the same year, the government sought to pass to the individual the responsibility for ensuring an income in old age over-and-above the minimalist basic state pension and to break with collective provision, whether by the state or by employers via an 'occupational pension' scheme. In the process, the architects of change had hoped also to personalise investment in British firms by turning the country into a nation of individual pension fund investors. The introduction of the new personal pensions was therefore explicitly about rebalancing away from the collective to the individual and, as such, provides a perfect opportunity to study how neoliberal conceptualisations of 'the individual' informed the development of policy.
On entering government in 1979 the Conservatives inherited a pensions structure comprised of two pillars. The first of these pillars -the basic state pension -provided a minimum income in retirement via a system of national insurance. In accordance with the original intentions of William Beveridge, this limited retirement income was supplemented by a second pillar of private pension arrangements, although this had come to be supplemented by a staterun alternative. Almost all private pension arrangements for workers other than the selfemployed took the form of occupational pensions, in which employers and employees contributed to a pension fund which was managed by the former (though often by an insurance company working on the employer's behalf). Occupational scheme membership had risen from SERPS did not invest in the market, it was a 'pay-as-you-go-scheme' in which contributions were recycled through the national insurance fund to pay present-day benefits, but it did offer an earnings-related top up to the basic state pension that would in combination provide to a worker retiring after forty years of service a pension of about fifty per cent of their income (as many occupational schemes did). In short, by the time the Conservatives took office in 1979 a second pillar of British pensions had come into being that covered all employed workers and which embodied a productive partnership between the state and employers.
The consensus that had been constructed around a mixed-economy second pensions pillar did not survive long for as soon as they were elected in 1979 the Conservatives broke with it, not least because they decried the future costs to the state of promises embodied in SERPS.
In 1984 an inquiry into the UK pensions system was set up under Following an inquiry which, as we will see, revealed only limited external support for 'Personal Pensions', the reform was introduced as part of the 1986 Social Security Act.
In the process of implementing pension reform, however, policy makers were forced to confront contradictions within the ideas that underlay the proposals for that reform. Most significantly, if this was a policy that individualised pensions, how exactly was the individual conceived? Was the typical individual making provision for their income in retirement to be an investor-capitalist or a consumer in the market for financial products; were their decisions likely to be rational or irrational; were they to be a risk-taking entrepreneur or a prudent saver?
III
As Letwin and Sutcliffe-Braithwaite have both argued, the Thatcher governments sought to reform the moral and behavioural norms of individuals within British society. However, the development of the 'Personal Pensions' policy demonstrates that there was no fixed vision of a prototypical Thatcherite individual. (Except in one respect -gender, for despite a marked rise in female participation in the labour force in the 1980s, and despite the fact that women had much poorer pension coverage than men (an issue that had been central to the reform of pensions in the 1970s), the architects of pension reforms in the 1980s routinely assumed that 'the individual' they were discussing was a man. Ironically, this was exactly the 'male breadwinner model' which had underpinned the Beveridge plan in the 1940s). Indeed, the conceptualisation of the individual by the architects of change was characterised by fundamental tensions and inconsistencies. The foremost of these concerned whether the aim should be to make individuals into investor-capitalists, or to create a society of free consumers.
The 1986 Social Security Act gave all individuals the right to leave their occupational pension scheme, or the State-run SERPS equivalent, and transfer their pension savings into a 'personal pension'. In doing so, individuals were afforded the freedom to choose from a variety of private providers who would be responsible for investing those savings on their behalf.
However, this was not the model envisaged by Nigel Vinson and Phillip Chappell when they first proposed the CPS' idea of individualising pensions. They wanted to provide a 'constructive alternative philosophy to socialism' which could 'spread wealth, decision making and self- '…unless some pension changes are introduced now to restore a greater sense of personal ownership, simplicity, and genuine involvement in the underlying asset, the nation's wealth, increasingly dominated by retirement provision, will be regarded as nobody's money'.
37
According to Vinson, the goal should be 'to turn "nobody's money" into "somebody's money."' 38 This was necessary because '…only if individuals participate directly in the creation of wealth can they understand the benefits which it brings to society at large.'
39
The CPS agenda was to help ensure the long-term survival and reinvigoration of capitalism by turning passive pension-savers into active investor-capitalists. Not only would the personalisation of pensions make individuals more aware of their own personal wealth, the CPS argued, but it would educate them in the operation of the capitalist system. Through their direct personal involvement in the wealth accumulation which was to support them in old-age, Faced with severe doubts about the preparedness and ability of individuals to invest their pension savings directly, the CPS and its supporters were forced into a change of emphasis.
Though they still claimed that 'the individual should be free, if he [sic] wishes, to determine absolutely his investment policy for his own portfolio, including personal stock selection', over time Vinson and Chappell were forced to demote the role of investor-capitalist to one that a minority of individuals should be able to choose if they were so inclined. 49 In giving oral evidence to the Fowler inquiry, Chappell stressed that the freedom to 'determine their investment portfolio, including personal stock-selection' would be a 'privilege that rather few people would want to take care of, but we think it is a privilege that they should have the Instead, all employees were encouraged to opt-out of SERPS or their occupational pension but were only permitted to choose 'the kind of body to invest their pension savings' on their behalf.
57
Indeed, individual investment freedoms were in fact severely curtailed as the government prohibited individuals from using their pension savings in a personal investment portfolio.
58
Moreover, institutions themselves were constrained in how they could invest, and individuals were forbidden from putting all their savings in risk-inclined schemes. the Cabinet, Fowler asserted that 'personal pensions are an essential element in our policy of improving job mobility and giving people more choice'.
61
The process by which these reforms emerged suggests a much more complex relationship between Thatcherism and neoliberalism than is often assumed. Advocates of personal pensions appear to have started from a shared diagnosis that individuals needed to be brought into a direct relationship with the capitalist system via the investments that would fund their old age. However, as they translated this into policy, scepticism as to how far this could be achieved in practice enforced a change of priorities -from investment and control, to freedom and choice.
62 Both of these positions were consonant with neoliberal ideological traditions (the former reflecting the ordoliberal concept of vitalpolitik; the latter in keeping with Hayek and the Chicago school), but it is only as a result of the frictions and limitations exposed in the policymaking process that the latter came to dominate.
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IV
The same collision between neoliberal theory and practice characterised attitudes to individuals' rationality. As Foucault noted, neoliberalism has at its heart an underlying assumption that homo economicus responds rationally to the invisible hand of the market.
64
Individuals 'become, as it were, entrepreneurs of themselves, shaping their own lives through the choices they make among the forms of life available to them'. 65 Yet we find in the pension policy making of the 1980s a continual tension between the idea of the individual as a rational actor 61 C (85) freely making fully-informed decisions about investing for their retirement and an implicit recognition of irrationality in that individuals could not be trusted to make the right decisions.
Writing as early as 1957, in Pensions in a Free Society, Arthur Seldon (then Editorial
Director at the Institute for Economic Affairs, a think tank identified by Cockett as later being at the heart of the neoliberal revolution in the UK) had decried the compulsory enrolment of staff into occupational pensions, arguing that individual employees should be allowed to opt out in order to exercise free choice. 66 Three years later, however, Seldon acknowledged the implicit irrationality of individuals in taking 'too short a view of the future' and accepted a role for the tax system in incentivising retirement savings. 67 From the start, therefore, the 'neoliberal' individual investor/saver was at once a rational exerciser of free choice and an irrational actor in need of guidance and (implicitly) of protection by the state to prevent them becoming dependent upon it in old age.
This tension was clearly evident in the Conservatives' reorientation of policy after This palette of contradictory conceptualisations of the individual persisted once the party entered government. For example, the presumed benefits and limits of individuals' ability to make rational self-interested decisions were especially evident in the CPS's publications and its written evidence to the Fowler enquiry. Yet, much as Personal and Portable Pensions for All intended to give all those in employment the option to administer their own pension, it also accepted that individual investment would not necessarily be for everyone and that some sort of state oversight and incentivisation would be needed to ensure that sufficient contributions were made and that they were invested effectively. Certainly the ultimate aim ('perhaps ahead of its time') was to move to an entirely individualised system in which individuals took their own decisions about retirement savings and investment; but even in that ambitious vision (less than 'rational') individuals were apparently still going to need incentives to save. One strong objection to the CPS's radical vision of individuals directly investing their retirement savings was doubt about the desire and ability of individual employees to make rational investment decisions. The life insurance company Legal and General, an enthusiastic proponent of personal pensions, commissioned consumer research into likely demand but this served to reveal that only a quarter of employees wanted a 'do-it-yourself' alternative to occupational pensions. Consequently, the insurer warned the Fowler enquiry that personal pensions would be suitable only for a minority of employees (and even then would need both continued tax incentivisation and regulation). 73 This active minority was to the fore in much evidence to that enquiry, which tended to conceptualise the potential PPP investor as at least 'reasonably competent' financially and more often as someone possessing both knowledge and initiative. Often those giving evidence implicitly presented that individual either as a business owner or, more commonly, as a more educated employee who might be interested in saving for retirement on their own account, but via 'safe' institutional funds investing predominantly in bonds rather than equities. Yet many were sceptical about the degree to which individuals were equipped to make such decisions. 74 For example, Ken Thomas of the TUC dismissed the idea that there was a large reservoir of financially well-informed employees wishing rationally and actively to undertake their own pension investment and found it 'quite laughable to imagine that the vast majority of working people of this country -and I am not insulting them -want the opportunity to play the stock markets themselves'. 75 The Society of Pensions Consultants warned that personal pensions were 'unlikely to be a "wise choice" for individuals' because 'given choice and lack of understanding many individuals could make decisions they might live to regret'.
Others warned of the potential for misselling (something plainly at odds with the idea of a rational and well-informed investor) -the chairman of the National Association of Pension Funds, for example, warned that the PPP 'opens up the prospect of some rich pickings for the commission only salesmen who have already been issued with their battle gear' and Save and
Prosper warned that 'people will be victims of dishonest or incompetent salesmen'. 77 We should therefore understand the CPS's forced retreat from its most radical policy option as a recognition that paternalistic guidance would remain the norm. Although the implied hope was that via the provision of PPPs and government tax reliefs on contributions individuals might be nudged away from that paternalism, even the CPS had to accept pragmatically the reality of widespread individual 'irrationality'.
We can clearly see this tension between the individual as a rational being or as someone in need of protection from their own irrationality in the response of the Central Policy Review Staff (No. 10's internal think tank) to its brief from the prime minister's office to produce a workable policy on personal pensions. 78 Although the CPRS's proposed policy agenda was rapidly repudiated by Thatcher for its startling and politically potentially explosive ambition (she plainly feared a potential 'pensions privatisation' controversy akin to that created by another CPRS memorandum on radical options for welfare state reform just over a month previouslywhich had created consternation in the cabinet and, when subsequently leaked to the Economist, a public outcry about the government's 'plans to privatise the NHS') the CPRS's analysis nonetheless captured many of the key tensions between ideology and practical policy. 79 The fundamental question posed by the CPRS ('Are people encouraged to be self-reliant and save as they think best for their retirement needs, or is the whole system weighed down by the paternalism of the state and corporations?'), signalled its intention to design a system premised on freeing the rational individual (not least by abolishing the 'paternalistic' SERPS). Yet, the CPRS always viewed this ability to make rational decisions as conditional. To 'encourage a selfreliant and responsible approach to retirement saving', it would be necessary both to incentivise independence through tax reliefs and to improve individuals' knowledge. In the long run, the latter would be achieved through 'better schooling to prepare people for life's financial responsibilities', but also by simplifying the system and reducing the state and employer paternalism that partly created ignorance. 80 The individual's ability rationally to save was therefore not seen as axiomatic by the CPRS; it required will and knowledge that must be shaped via a complex system of compulsion, incentivisation, and education.
Thus, when confronted with the reality of existing saving behaviours, the CPRS's proposals for portable occupational pensions accepted the need for paternalistic compulsion to counteract suspected irrationality. It was particularly concerned about higher-earning middle managers who benefited from SERPS, but were themselves 'not used to saving significantly for retirement' and faced competing commitments, such as family and home-purchasing, during their working lives. 'Until the habit of saving became much more deeply integrated', it was not likely that 'this group would save as much for retirement privately as they now do compulsorily through pooled schemes'. To resolve this the CPRS suggested that companies might continue to enforce a minimum level of saving so that 'these employees would have the right to choose how to save, (i.e. through the company scheme or through a POP), but not whether to save'.
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The acceptance that many would fall short of the ideal of a rational and perfectly informed actor taking active responsibility for the investment of their retirement savings was clearly also evident in the later DHSS consultative document. In this, Fowler recognised that 'many people will be content to stay in their employer's scheme, with the advantages that large- scale investment and expert management can offer.' 82 For those wanting to take up the opportunity to take out a personal pension there would not just be fiscal incentives but also a requirement to make a minimum level of contributions. Those contributions would be made to government-approved pension savings schemes that would operate within a regulatory framework (though this would turn out to be inadequate) and there were to be restrictions on what types of investment would be eligible. As the DHSS put it, 'Pension decisions have major long-term effects and therefore there must be safeguards for the public'. 83 This was to be a world of incentivised individual pension savings in pooled funds run by regulated institutions.
Rationality was thus not taken as a given; it would have to be shaped, but also constrained.
Although the CPS welcomed the government's 'personal pension' proposals as the first step on the way to its desired personalisation of pension wealth, the truth was that in the process of reform a substantial reconfiguration had taken place that had required a reconceptualization of individual rationality. 84 The initial conception of PPPs had been founded on the idea of a rational, well-informed and active investor accumulating capital through direct investment in British firms; the PPP as actually implemented was founded on a vision of the individual as a relatively uninformed and passive saver; someone who was sometimes rational enough to recognise the need to save for old age income replacement and prepared to exercise freedom of choice within the market place; but also someone reliant on, and happy to defer to, the knowledge and investment skills of a financial institution. Individual freedom of choice (shaped by compulsion and incentives) in an intermediated and regulated market had triumphed over the reconfiguration of British capitalism by an army of active and rational individual investors. Entrepreneurialism was central to Thatcherism's development as a political and economic project. Thatcher herself valorised small business owners and the self-employed as 'wealth creators' whose decisions to 'leave the security of employment' created the profits and jobs vital to Britain's prosperity. 85 In contrast, she portrayed socialists as vindictively attacking entrepreneurs, who resisted state intervention and were 'not the raw material on which to build a Socialist society'. 86 Moreover, Thatcherites diagnosed Britain's 'sickness' as resulting from a deficiency of entrepreneurial risk and investment. The Right Approach to the Economy, for example, identified in 1977 a 'dearth of private risk capital… at the root of many of the small business sector's problems'. 87 To reverse the habit of living off capital accumulated by past generations, Geoffrey Howe, the future Chancellor, promised to 'restore the legitimacy of getting rich by taking risks'. 88 Thatcherism thus constructed both its political and economic narratives around the entrepreneur's values and economic utility.
At the same time, Thatcherism connected the Tory themes of thrift and saving with the critique of dependency outlined above. 'If you value independence and self-reliance, then you will practice thrift to achieve them', Thatcher argued, and her 'kind of Tory party' would, therefore, encourage saving. 89 Brought together as middle Britain's threatened values, saving and entrepreneurialism could be complementary: 'if both saving and enterprise are penalised', Thatcher warned the 1975 Conservative Women's Conference, then 'those who can do most to increase the prosperity of the workers will simply take their money and their skills abroad'. 90 Yet, this common identity and relationship with prosperity hid an underlying tension.
Entrepreneurialism was praiseworthy precisely because it required individuals to 'risk the modest savings on which the family would depend in hard times' in pursuit of independence. From the beginning, then, Thatcher's medicine contained a potentially volatile blend of thrift and risk. Yet, the tension between prudent saving and risk also exposed contradictions within the CPS's claims about the ability of greater competition and choice to better align institutions'
investment strategies with the needs of the entrepreneurial economy. On the one hand, the CPS argued that the new market created by personal pensions would encourage existing institutions and new providers to offer a wider range of products that reflected different levels of risk.
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Pensions providers would themselves become more entrepreneurial organisations, and, as the products they offered embraced more risk, they would fuel entrepreneurial activity in the wider economy. On the other hand, when it needed to reassure ministers that people's savings would be managed responsibly, the CPS downplayed the market changes that personal pensions would bring about. It argued that many existing occupational schemes would set up individual (socalled unitised) schemes designed for handling personal pensions, and these, the CPS maintained, would likely 'adopt the investment strategies of the main fund'. 105 Thus, when necessary, the CPS admitted that many personal pensions would be invested according to the very strategies that it claimed stymied entrepreneurship.
Regardless of whether individuals or fund managers selected the underlying assets, personal pensions could not offer the certainty of occupational schemes because they were inherently riskier, being susceptible to the performance of selected investments, wider market volatility, and inflation. Yet, protection against the latter was a key goal for prudent savers in the 1980s, and earlier forms of 'defined contribution' pensions (i.e. pensions the value of which would depend on contributions and investment performance rather than on any defined benefit such as a proportion of final salary) were widely condemned for leaving pensioners vulnerable to inflation. For all advocates of personal pensions, the 1982 innovation of inflation-proofed 'index-linked' government securities offered a means of overcoming similar objections.
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However, this solution contradicted the claims made for personal pensions as a motor for entrepreneurial activity since the underlying assets were an investment in government debt, not in new or expanding businesses. Insofar as personal pensions depended upon 'index-linked gilts to protect against inflation [they did] not increase enterprise', the Treasury's advice concluded.
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Far from encouraging risk-taking, they would encourage the investor 'to sit back, secure in the knowledge that the taxpayer was taking the full risk of inflation-proofing his pension'. 108 They might even make it harder for entrepreneurs to borrow by weakening the market for risk-bearing opportunities. 109 Thus, measures designed to mitigate the initial tension between prudent saving and risky entrepreneurial investment inadvertently created a further wave of contradictions that undermined personal pensions' ability to act as a spur to entrepreneurial activity. Security Division) even turned the aim of entrepreneurialism against the project's individualising premise. Given that collective schemes could pool risk they would logically be able to 'undertake more venture capital investment than an individual saving for retirement', making 'greater entrepreneurial thrust in pension schemes… a more promising avenue'. 112 The tension between entrepreneurship and saving was not simply forcing the CPS to trim its ambitions; it allowed its opponents within the Treasury to expose a basic incompatibility between its aims.
It is unsurprising, then, that the government largely abandoned entrepreneurialism as a justification for reform. Legislation introduced a measure of portability: anyone changing jobs could transfer all their pension rights to a personal pension. 113 Yet, excepting a few short references to job creation, neither the 1984 Green Paper nor the final policy explicitly connected labour mobility and entrepreneurialism. 114 Nor did the 1986 legislation include the CPS's radical proposals for individuals to be allowed to invest directly in venture opportunities, managementbuy-outs, their employer's companies, or in their own businesses (because they were judged to be too risky). In fact, even the CPS recalibrated its argument. Its Pensions Privilege (1988) maintained that individuals should have direct control over their investments and that this liberation would enable them to invest either in their employers' businesses or in other ventures, such as their 'nephew's newly established software business'. 115 However, the claimed benefits of such direct control were now said to lie in the improved performance of businesses with high rates of 'employee financial participation' and in the increased personal freedom to choose riskier investments over the diversification recommended by 'so-called superior wisdom'. 116 Indeed, the CPS's earlier claim that personal pensions would kick-start a newly entrepreneurial society was now only made implicitly. Thus, unlike arguments for unmediated ownership or individual responsibility, which remained central to the personal pensions case after their most radical policy expression had fallen away, the entrepreneurial argument for personal pensions was allowed to fade.
VI
The Thatcher era left Britain with a reconfigured pensions system that gave individuals the freedom to make their own arrangements by purchasing personal pension products offered by financial service companies. Thus, the individual taking out a personal pension was expected to act as a consumer whose agency was expressed through free choice within a competitive market. These choices were, however, both bounded by the state and institutionally mediated: to ensure that individuals acted rationally they were seen to require guidance, protection, and incentives provided by the state; and the investment of their pensions savings would be undertaken by private pension providers rather than via direct investment. While a minority might have been trusted to make the correct decisions on their own, the government's pension legislation reflected its pragmatic acceptance of a population of individuals with varying (and generally very low) levels of financial knowledge, entrepreneurial and risk-taking inclination, rationality, and propensities to save. 116 Ibid.
The findings presented here clearly reveal an 'implementation gap' between what one might term 'Thatcherism in principle', and 'Thatcherism in practice'. 117 For example, when confronted with the actually-existing individual, who was said to be either reluctant or unable to make investment decisions alone, the CPS's plan for unmediated individual access to investment markets was rejected. Yet it was not only the 'crooked timber of humanity' that constrained the Thatcherite agenda. Our analysis has demonstrated that there were fundamental variations and contradictions in how the individual under Thatcherism was both conceptualised and expected to behave by the various architects of reform. Most notably, the intention to use the pensions system in support of entrepreneurialism did not sit easily with the stated intention of encouraging individuals to be prudent savers.
What does the analysis reveal about Thatcherism and its relationship with neoliberalism?
Should we see the eventual 'personal pensions' reforms as a failure to implement 'true' neoliberalism -as championed by Vinson and Chappell? 118 That would be problematic because, although the CPS ideal of creating a pension system which produced entrepreneurial, individual investor-capitalists was abandoned, its replacement (individual free choice of products from multiple providers) accords neatly with Hayek's proposal for compulsory private insurance in The Constitution of Liberty. 119 A simple metric which purports to measure the degree of 'neoliberalism' thus fails to account for the many varieties of neoliberalism. Furthermore, this inconsistency both within and between neoliberal thought and practice challenges the tendency for those working in the Foucauldian tradition to identify an essential neoliberal subjectivity being formed in this period.
We should, instead, understand Thatcherism as a pathway through the diverse array of neoliberal ideas (many, though not all, of which were rooted in the Conservative Party's intellectual traditions). In the case of 'personal pensions', the policymaking process was instigated by a unique strain of neoliberalism advocated by the CPS. However, as the original proposals were made concrete, some of the initial intentions were jettisoned or downplayed whilst other neoliberal ideas (easily available and adaptable) were embraced and/or took on a newfound centrality. Sometimes, these shifts in the dominance of particular conceptions of the individual arose from a clash of alternative ideas within neoliberal theory or from the confrontation of those ideas with reality; but on other occasions shifts arose from the apparent incompatibility of different conceptions of the individual. In the working out of those contradictions some original aims could survive (for example the desire to break institutional power persisted to an extent despite its mechanism switching from direct ownership to consumer choice). Other aims, however, most notably the desire to use pensions saving to encourage entrepreneurialism, were forced out or downgraded.
Attempts to introduce 'personal pensions' in the 1980s should, therefore, reinforce historians' developing suspicions that we need to move beyond an increasingly sterile debate about whether Thatcherism was a personal project; implicit in post-war Conservatism; mere Statecraft; or a local expression of a monolithic transnational ideology. We should instead build on Sutcliffe-Braithwaite's recognition that Thatcherism reflected particular strains of neoliberalism compatible with Thatcherites' specific readings of their Conservative inheritance.
Yet, our analysis also suggests that historians must resist the temptation to characterise the more complex 'ideology' that actually emerged as either coherent or stable. Nor should we simply see it as the haphazard remains of a pre-formed ideology that was constrained by pragmatic accommodation with reality. Thatcherism was, in sum, a dynamic, agile political project, whose real-world ideological expressions were not so much derived from stable principles as constructed 'in flight' as politicians, civil servants and stakeholders negotiated the profound contradictions they discovered within the underlying neoliberal ideas. There was no coherent, pre-formed 'neoliberal individual' at the heart of the Thatcherism. If the Thatcher governments' original intention to was to create a society of entrepreneurial investor capitalists, this was destroyed by an accumulation of tensions and inconsistencies within that particular vision. From the wreckage of this ideal emerged an alternative conceptualisation of the individual upon which was built a reform agenda based on managed consumer choice in a competitive marketplace.
